Fyodor Lukyanov: This is the fatal flaw of Trump’s Ukraine ‘strategy’

by Fyodor Lukyanov [7-15-2025 published].

Trump’s rhetoric masks a deeper instinct to disengage – and a refusal to confront Moscow on substance.

Fyodor Lukyanov is one of the most prominent Russian experts in the field of international relations and foreign policy. He has worked in journalism since 1990 and is the author of numerous publications on modern international relations and Russian foreign policy. Since 2002, he has been the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs – a magazine conceived as a platform for dialogue and debate among foreign and Russian experts and policymakers. In 2012, he was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy of Russia, one of the oldest Russian NGOs. Since 2015, he has been the Director for Scientific Work of the Foundation for Development and Support of the Valdai International Discussion Club. He works as a research professor at the Faculty of World Economy and Global Politics at the National Research University Higher School of Economics.

Donald Trump’s recent comments on Ukraine were highly anticipated, especially given his habit of surprising even those who consider themselves seasoned observers. His remarks on 14 July, delivered alongside NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, were characteristically loud but ultimately underwhelming. That in itself should not be surprising. Over the past six months, Trump’s style on major international issues has followed a familiar pattern. Ukraine is no exception.

At the heart of Trump’s approach lies a calculated strategy of noise. He generates maximum bluster to create the impression of strength and decisiveness. What follows is not action, but an endless repetition of simple slogans. Clarification is deliberately avoided, the aim being to appear both consistent and unpredictable. Behind this theater lies a reluctance to become truly entangled in any foreign conflict. Trump wants short, manageable involvement with low costs and quick exit ramps. Above all, he is not willing to challenge the mainstream consensus in Washington as deeply as he claims. For all the bluster, Trump remains tethered to the very ‘Deep State’ he rails against.

The Israel-Iran confrontation earlier this year offers a textbook example. One dramatic strike on Iranian nuclear sites gave the impression of a bold move. It satisfied different parts of Trump’s base, pleased Israel, and sent a message to Tehran – without triggering a regional war. Trump got to claim a geopolitical ‘win’ and was once again floated as a Nobel Peace Prize candidate. But for all the headlines, little actually changed. Iran’s nuclear program continues, and the political dynamics of the region remain largely intact. Still, Trump presented it as a major American contribution to world peace.

The problem is, Ukraine is not the Middle East. It is far more complex, and Trump appears to know it. His instinct is to avoid the problem altogether. But he can’t. The conflict is now a central issue in US-European relations, and Trump’s own supporters are split between isolationists and hawks. He knows he cannot ignore Ukraine outright. Nor can he allow Biden’s war to become his. This explains the repeated emphasis in his ‘It’s Not My War’ speech. He said it three times.

So, what did Trump actually propose? Not much. He suggested that America’s European allies should send Ukraine their old weapons systems – especially Patriot batteries – and then buy new ones from the United States, paying “100 percent.” That, for Trump, is the core of the plan: turn war into business. The logic is simple and familiar. Europe gets rid of its aging stock, Ukraine gets support, and America gets orders. But the practicalities remain vague: what systems, what timeline, what delivery mechanisms? These were left unclear.

Then there’s the question of exerting economic pressure on Russia. Trump approved a plan to impose 100 percent tariffs on Russian exports to third countries. This is a more moderate version of Senator Lindsey Graham’s 500 percent threat. The idea is to squeeze Russia economically without enforcing a full embargo. But here, too, the scheme is light on details. The White House will issue the duties and can cancel them at will. Implementation will be delayed by 50 days – standard Trump trade deal tactics. Nothing is final. Everything is leverage.

The real message is that Trump is still negotiating. He can’t reach a deal with Putin, but he wants to pressure Moscow without entering into an open confrontation. He still refuses to personally attack Putin, saying only that he is “very dissatisfied” and “disappointed.” That signals he is keeping his options open. He wants credit for any peace that might emerge but is unwilling to own the risks of deeper engagement.

Trump also repeated his claim to being the world’s premier peacemaker, listing off a string of supposed triumphs – India-Pakistan, Israel-Iran, Serbia-Kosovo, Gaza (“well, almost”), the DRC and Rwanda, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Egypt and a “neighboring country” (apparently forgetting the name of Ethiopia). These boasts reflect the core Trump method: declare success, repeat it often, and rely on public attention spans being short.

Despite the showmanship, the risk of American entanglement in Ukraine remains high. The measures Trump has announced will not meaningfully shift the military-political balance, but they may prolong the war, at increased cost. Meanwhile, the channel of negotiation opened by Trump’s call to Putin in February appears to be closing. Trump is reportedly irritated with Moscow, but Russia has not moved an inch. Nor does it plan to. Putin sees no reason to adapt his position simply to accommodate Trump’s political timetable.

There are rumors that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov delivered some new proposals to Senator Marco Rubio in Malaysia. But based on past experience, these are almost certainly familiar Russian talking points in new packaging. Moscow’s approach to resolving the Ukrainian crisis has remained unchanged for over three years. Trump’s rhetoric won’t alter that.

From the Kremlin’s perspective, Washington no longer has the capacity to engage at the same level as it did in 2023–2024. The political will, financial resources, and strategic bandwidth simply aren’t there. Half-measures from the US won’t deliver results, though they may prolong the conflict. That is unfortunate, but not sufficient cause for Moscow to adjust its course.

Trump, for his part, doesn’t want to stay on the Ukraine file. He wants to move on – and fast. Many in the Pentagon share that view. But the war will not end just because Washington wants to focus elsewhere. Neither side has a clear long-term strategy. What remains is inertia – and inertia, for now, is stronger than intent.

This article was first published by the magazine Profile and was translated and edited by the RT team.

Related

‘Russia doesn’t respond to pressure’: How Moscow sees Trump’s ultimatum [7-15-2025]

By Georgiy Berezovsky, Vladikavkaz-based journalist.

(This article also contains photos of each contributor. The following people have a lot of insights worth reading. — RAD)

From skepticism to strategic recalculations, Russian analysts interpret Washington’s new pressure campaign – and its limits.

On Monday, July 14, US President Donald Trump issued a stark ultimatum: Russia has 50 days to reach a peace agreement, or face “very severe” tariffs on its exports – potentially as high as 100%. The move signals a shift from rhetorical posturing to a time-bound strategy aimed at forcing negotiations.

While Trump’s statement made waves in Washington and Europe, it is the reaction from Moscow that may prove most consequential. In this roundup, RT presents a cross-section of views from Russian political analysts, foreign policy scholars, and institutional insiders – voices that provide a window into how the American ultimatum is being interpreted in Russia.

Dmitry Suslov, deputy director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at HSE University:

Trump’s remarks are a major setback for any meaningful progress on Ukraine and will likely freeze US-Russia normalization for the foreseeable future. Zelensky now has no incentive to engage in serious negotiations with Moscow or consider the terms outlined in the Russian ceasefire memorandum.

Meanwhile, the European ‘party of war’ will seize on Trump’s statements as cover to promise Ukraine an endless stream of military aid – further escalating the conflict. The result? No truce, no talks, just a deepening of hostilities. Kiev may even walk away from the Istanbul peace process in the coming months – unless the battlefield situation shifts dramatically in Ukraine’s favor.

As for US-Russia relations, they were already at a standstill. Washington had effectively put dialogue on hold. Now, that pause could drag on indefinitely. When Trump issues ultimatums, sets arbitrary deadlines, and threatens Russia’s key trading partners with 100% tariffs, it’s clear there’s no space for normalization – or cooperation.

That said, unlike the Biden administration, Trump’s team appears committed to keeping diplomatic channels open with Moscow, regardless of whether there’s progress on Ukraine. But this isn’t an opening for a settlement on Russia’s terms. Trump’s goal is to pressure Moscow into compromise – something that simply isn’t going to happen.

His statement also signals that he has no intention of letting Congress dictate US foreign policy. He wants full control over tariffs – their size, timing, and structure. That’s why it’s entirely possible he’ll tweak or delay his self-imposed deadline.

Ivan Timofeev, program director of the Valdai Club:

1. Trump is frustrated with Moscow’s position on Ukraine.
Russia has refused to freeze the conflict on terms favorable to the US and Kiev – a signal that Trump sees dialogue as having hit a dead end.

2. The Lindsey Graham sanctions bill is now much more likely to pass.
Among other things, it would authorize secondary tariffs of up to 500% on countries that import Russian oil and other raw materials. While the US president already has the power to impose these measures unilaterally under IEEPA, the bill would bring Congress into alignment and add yet another layer to the already sprawling legal web of sanctions on Russia.

3. Trump would have full discretion over these secondary tariffs.
That could mean 100%, 500%, or anything in between – and he could calibrate them differently depending on bilateral relations. For example, India might face lower tariffs, China higher ones – or he might apply them uniformly. The Iran sanctions precedent shows that countries which reduced oil purchases were granted exemptions as a reward for ‘good behavior’.

4. A coordinated pushback from the Global South is unlikely.
Trump has already been pressuring both allies and neutral countries with new tariffs since April – and most are caving. Even China is treading carefully. So in the short term, we may see reduced purchases of Russian commodities simply out of a desire to avoid Trump’s wrath. Alternatively, countries may demand a higher risk premium. While there’s a lot of rhetorical support for Russia in the Global South, few are willing to stick their necks out when it comes to action.

5. Trump’s 50-day deadline amounts to an ultimatum.
Moscow will almost certainly ignore it, making the imposition of secondary tariffs a highly probable – perhaps even default – scenario. That said, Russia isn’t without leverage, limited though it may be. And it’s clearly preparing for a hardline path. Tight global commodity markets and well-established export channels work in Russia’s favor.

6. This may mark the end of backchannel diplomacy on Ukraine.
Sanctions will be ramped up, and arms deliveries to Kiev are likely to intensify. Russia, for its part, will maintain military pressure. We’re back to a familiar standoff: The West betting on economic collapse in Russia, while Moscow counts on Ukraine’s military defeat and the West’s internal turmoil. But after three years, it’s clear neither side’s assumptions have panned out. Sanctions haven’t broken Russia’s resolve, and the war effort is now on a new long-term footing.

7. The optimism in Russian markets is puzzling.
Yes, sanctions haven’t been imposed just yet – which some investors may have hoped for – but the risk landscape has only worsened. The current rally looks short-lived. Those banking on a quick end to sanctions may be in for a long wait.

Timofey Bordachev, professor at the Higher School of Economics:

In theater or film, ‘playing a scene’ means performing a role convincingly – conveying emotions, building a character, advancing the plot. Donald Trump does that rather well. He seems to grasp a fundamental truth: Bold moves between nuclear superpowers are dangerous precisely because they are impossible. They risk the irreversible – and Trump clearly wants no part of that. On some level, he understands that the diplomatic chess match will drag on indefinitely, and that there are no clean resolutions. Still, the show must go on – and the audience must be entertained.

That’s why Trump substitutes real strategy with theatrics: Shifting arms deliveries to NATO, proposing a new financing scheme for Kiev, tossing around tariff threats against Russia and its trading partners. It’s about constantly filling the political space with action – or at least the illusion of it – to avoid the impression of paralysis or failure. If no progress is made on Ukraine within 50 days, he’ll unveil a new plan that overwrites the old one.

None of these announcements should be treated as final or irreversible – and in that, Trump is perfectly in tune with the nature of today’s international politics. His behavior isn’t a deviation – it’s a reflection of the system.

Maxim Suchkov, director of the Institute for International Studies at MGIMO University:

Trump’s statement brings both good and bad news for Moscow. The good news is that the final decision was largely predictable – no surprises, no sudden turns. As is often the case with Trump, the ‘teaser’ for his policy was more dramatic than the main act. Europe wants to continue the war – and Trump is happy to let it pay the price. For now, he’s held back from embracing the more radical measures proposed by the hawks in his circle, which means dialogue with Washington is still on the table.

The bad news: After six months in office, Trump still hasn’t grasped Russia’s position or understood President Putin’s logic. It’s as if the repeated visits to Moscow by Steve Witkoff never even registered with him. More broadly, Trump seems to have learned very little about this conflict. And that’s a problem – because without some form of resolution and a working relationship with Moscow, key elements of Trump’s domestic agenda simply aren’t achievable.

Either he genuinely believes the Ukraine conflict can be settled by setting a deadline and hoping for the best – or he just doesn’t care. Maybe this is just his way of playing global peacemaker: Making noise, tossing out promises to fix everything, knowing full well there will be no political consequences if he fails. American voters won’t judge him on Ukraine.

Which scenario is worse is anyone’s guess. But one thing is clear: If anyone still had hopes for this administration to play a serious role in ending the conflict, those hopes look misplaced. Whether they were premature – or already outdated – we’ll find out in 50 days.

Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs:

If you strip Trump’s latest White House remarks down to their essence, one thing stands out: He still desperately wants to avoid becoming a full party to the conflict – in other words, he doesn’t want a head-on confrontation with Russia. That’s why he keeps repeating that this is “Biden’s war,” not his. From Trump’s perspective, what he announced is a cautious, compromise-driven approach.

First, the tariffs he’s threatening on Russian commodities – and let’s be clear, these aren’t ‘sanctions’ in his lexicon – have been postponed until the fall. Just like in other cases, the offer of negotiations remains open.

Second, the US won’t be sending weapons to Ukraine directly. Deliveries will go through Europe, and only on a full-cost basis – meaning the Europeans will foot the bill. To Trump, that’s not direct confrontation with Moscow – it’s a way to nudge the parties toward talks.

We can set aside the usual flood of self-congratulation and NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte’s over-the-top flattery – that’s all part of the ritual now.

Russia is unlikely to see this as a genuine invitation to dialogue. It’s pressure – and the Russian leadership doesn’t respond to pressure. It’s also a worsening, though perhaps not a dramatic one, of the military situation for Russian forces, which naturally elicits a response. But Moscow won’t engage in verbal sparring. There’s no point. The conversation is now happening on the battlefield.

Most likely, we’ve reached the end of the first phase of US-Russia relations under Trump – a six-month stretch now drawing to a close. When the next phase begins, and what it looks like, remains anyone’s guess.

Dmitry Novikov, associate professor at the Higher School of Economics:

Trump’s bombastic statement – supplemented by his Q&A with reporters – boils down to three core messages.

First, the objective hasn’t changed: Washington still wants a deal on Ukraine, but only on terms acceptable to the US.

Second, the carrot for Moscow remains the same: Promises of good political relations (‘talking to Putin is always pleasant’) and vague suggestions of future economic cooperation (‘Russia has enormous potential’).

Third, the stick – for now – isn’t particularly impressive. The announcement of Patriot systems for Ukraine is just the latest iteration of something Trump and his team have floated before: Boosting Kiev’s air defenses to protect against Russian strikes. And that, it seems, bothers Trump more than the frontline situation itself. He’s criticized Russia before for deep strikes into Ukrainian territory, and he did it again this time – presumably after being shown some grim images.

As for other weapons, there were no specifics – just the familiar ‘billions of dollars in military aid’ line.

The introduction of 100% secondary tariffs, delayed by 50 days, appears to be Trump’s main instrument of coercion. As an economic determinist, he likely believes this is his most powerful and effective threat. But whether it will actually be implemented is unclear. Previous efforts to squeeze Russian energy exports – price caps, import bans – didn’t exactly shut the flow. Russia adapted.

In essence, the message is more psychological than strategic: You’ve got 50 days. After that, I’ll ‘get serious’.

But Trump left one key question unanswered: How far is the US actually willing to go if there’s no progress after 50 days? If tariffs are the endgame, and Washington backs off after that, that’s one scenario. But if those tariffs are just the prelude to broader military or political escalation, that’s something else entirely.

Trump deliberately keeps things murky, leaning on the old idea that ‘a threat is more powerful than an attack’. He seems to be counting on Moscow to imagine the worst.

Nikolai Topornin, director of the Center for European Information:

With his latest statement, Trump didn’t just leave a crack open for Russia – he threw the window wide. He made clear he expects a practical response from Moscow within the next 50 days. As things stand, nothing prevents Russia from acting on the terms previously discussed with Trump: Initiating a 30-day ceasefire and entering talks with Kiev to start hashing out a concrete peace agreement.

Of course, the problem remains that many of Russia’s proposals are fundamentally at odds with Ukraine’s position. Still, from a diplomatic standpoint, the ball is now in Moscow’s court. And Kiev, in the meantime, comes out as the clear short-term beneficiary of Trump’s announcement.

We can expect the usual statements from Moscow rejecting the pressure – that sanctions don’t scare Russia. And it’s true that US-Russia trade is already near zero. There are no billion-dollar contracts left to speak of. Most economic ties were severed back in the Biden era. Washington has already imposed sweeping sanctions on Russian businesses and the financial sector.

So if nothing changes over the next 50 days, the US will likely continue expanding military aid to Ukraine – but on a pragmatic basis. In doing so, Washington can channel European funding to keep its own defense industry running at full speed.

Sergey Oznobishchev, head of the Military-Political Analysis and Research Projects Section at IMEMO RAS:

Trump needs to save face. He once vowed to end the conflict in a single day – but that hasn’t happened. Russia isn’t backing down, isn’t agreeing to a ceasefire with Ukraine, and isn’t halting its offensive. There’s nothing Trump can point to and sell as even a partial fulfillment of that campaign promise. So now he’s under pressure to act.

He’s signaling to Moscow that he expects some kind of reciprocal move – and he’s trying to extract it through a mix of diplomatic pressure and economic threats.

What exactly Trump discussed with the Russian president remains unclear. But it’s likely that Russia’s core position was laid out: Full control over the territories now enshrined in its constitution. Russia simply cannot walk away from those claims. It’s even possible that Trump’s 50-day deadline is meant as a tacit acknowledgment of that reality – a window for Russia to consolidate its hold before talks resume. That would be his version of compromise.

Trump often opens negotiations with bold, hardline offers – the kind you ‘can’t refuse’, as American political lore puts it – only to walk them back later and land somewhere in the middle. That’s his style, drawn straight from the world of business deals: Apply pressure first, then strike a bargain.

Of course, these latest announcements – especially the pledge to send weapons – will only increase criticism of Trump within Russia. Still, this isn’t the harshest stance he could have taken. It’s a tough message, but one that still leaves room for maneuver.

Nikolai Silayev, senior research fellow at the Institute for International Studies, MGIMO University:

I wouldn’t say we’re standing at the brink of a new escalation. Trump hasn’t endorsed the sanctions bill currently under discussion in Congress. Instead, he’s talking about imposing 100% tariffs by executive order – just as he’s done in the past. In doing so, he’s clearly distancing himself from that legislation.

There are no immediate sanctions coming. The 50-day timeline he mentioned is just the latest in a series of deadlines he’s floated before.

On the one hand, Trump wants to avoid sliding back into the kind of confrontation with Russia that defined the Biden era. On the other, he doesn’t want to see Ukraine defeated – nor is he willing to accept a Russian ceasefire on Moscow’s terms, since that could be spun as a US loss, and by extension, a personal failure. He keeps repeating that this is “Biden’s war” – but the longer it drags on, the more it becomes his own.

As for the Patriots, it’s Europe that will be footing the bill. Trump didn’t promise any new funding from the US budget. What remains to be seen is how many systems and missiles the US defense industry can actually produce – and how many European countries are willing to buy.

From Moscow’s perspective, this is still the US arming Ukraine. Washington is also continuing to share intelligence and support logistics. No one in the Kremlin is going to say, ‘Thank you, Grandpa Trump – now you’re just a vendor’. That’s not how this will be seen.

Sergey Poletaev, political commentator:

The scale of this conflict is such that no single move – not by the US, not by Russia, not by anyone – can produce a sudden breakthrough. The only person who could do that is Vladimir Zelensky – by surrendering. There’s no weapon system that could fundamentally change the course of this war, short of nuclear arms. And the only other game-changer would be direct involvement by the US or NATO – but if they’d wanted that, they would’ve intervened long ago.

As for Trump’s tariff threats against Russia and its trading partners – that’s really just kicking the can down the road for another 50 days. Classic Trump.

From Russia’s standpoint, we’re not shipping anything to the US anyway. As for our trading partners – yes, we’re talking about China and India. But this move would only add to the contradictions in Trump’s chaotic tariff diplomacy, where every issue is approached through economic threats. I don’t think it’s going to work.

I don’t see how Trump thinks he can pressure India. China – maybe. But Beijing is already staring down a whole slew of tariff threats. One more won’t make things easier – just worse. If anything, it will reinforce the idea that the US sees China as vulnerable to pressure. And that’s not a message China will take lightly.

Konstantin Kosachev, Russian senator and foreign affairs specialist:

If this is all Trump had to say about Ukraine today, then the hype was definitely overblown. Most of Lindsey Graham’s alarmist fantasies remain just that – fantasies. A 500% sanctions package makes little practical sense.

As for Europe, it looks like they’ll keep picking up the tab – again and again. What they thought was free cheese turned out to be a trap. The only true beneficiary here is the US defense industry.

Ukraine, meanwhile, is left to fight until the last Ukrainian – a fate they seem to have chosen for themselves.

But 50 days is a long time. A lot can change – on the battlefield, in Washington, and in NATO capitals. What matters most, though, is that none of this has any real impact on our own determination. At least, that’s how I see it.

Alexander Dugin, political philosopher and commentator:

Trump has given Russia 50 days to complete the job: To fully liberate our four regions, take Kharkov, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk – and ideally, Kiev. After that, he’s promised to get truly angry and hit back with 100% tariffs on our key oil buyers – India and China. That’s a serious threat.

So now we have 50 days to finish what we’ve left unfinished over the past 25 years.

This is precisely the kind of moment captured in the old Russian saying: ‘We take a long time to harness the horses, but we ride fast’. Given the circumstances, I believe any weapons can be used, against any targets. We have 50 days to win.