Larry Johnson: Bessent Doesn’t Understand that He Can’t Weaponize the Dollar with Iran and Bank On It with China
by Larry Johnson(opens in new tab) [8-21-2026] Larry C. Johnson(bio)(opens in new tab).
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent had a schizophrenic Thursday. Asked on CNBC why oil had jumped on the administration’s latest Iran threats, he professed bewilderment: “I’m not sure why oil has popped up on this.” In separate remarks the same day he went further — “We’ve got a spike in oil prices today that I don’t really understand” — and waved the move away as noise. Apparently he forgot that this was hours after he had announced that the United States would keep its naval blockade and impose what he called the toughest sanctions in history on Iran, adding, “This will work.” It was a day after Trump had promised the “MOST CRUSHING ECONOMIC OPERATION EVER TAKEN AGAINST ANY COUNTRY!“
The driver of the oil spike was obvious to everyone who wasn’t at the Treasury podium: Iran had pledged to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed, and Washington was escalating, not winding down. A Fox co-host remarked that literally everyone else understood what was moving the price. What makes Bessent’s puzzlement worth dwelling on is that it was not confined to oil. In the very same week, a second market delivered the same verdict on the same policies — and it, too, is a market Bessent insists he can manage. The bond market was voting, and the world’s largest holders of US debt were heading, quietly, for the exits.
On August 17 the Treasury released its Treasury International Capital data for June. Foreign holdings of US government debt fell to $9.299 trillion, down $72.1 billion from May — the third monthly decline in four months. The selling was led by the two biggest official holders. Japan, the largest, trimmed its book; China, the third largest, cut its holdings to roughly $633 billion, down from $659 billion the month before and a fraction of its 2013 peak above $1.3 trillion. More striking than the stock was the flow: net foreign inflows into U.S. securities collapsed from $56.6 billion to $6.8 billion in a single month. Foreigners weren’t dumping en masse — they were doing something quieter and, in its way, more telling. They were buying far less new paper and letting existing bonds roll off. The marginal foreign bid, the thing that finances American deficits at tolerable rates, was thinning out.
The price of that thinning bid showed up immediately in yields. The 30-year Treasury yield spiked to around 5.34 percent — a level not seen in nearly two decades — before the Treasury intervened. For a government that must refinance a $40 trillion debt pile, much of it issued when the 10-year note yielded under 2 percent, every tick higher in yields is a compounding fiscal problem. Net interest payments have already run to roughly $963 billion in the first ten months of fiscal 2026, about 15 percent of all federal spending. The market that Bessent most needs to keep calm — the one that sets the government’s cost of borrowing — was doing the opposite of calm.
So the same week produced two readings from two different instruments. Oil at nearly $90 said the strait is shut and the war is escalating. The bond drawdown and the 5.3 percent long bond said the world is repricing the risk of holding dollars and dollar debt. Bessent called the first one noise he doesn’t understand. He has not offered a theory of the second, either — but his actions this week tell you he understands it perfectly well.
On August 19, the Treasury announced it would at least double its buybacks of long-dated debt, from $2 billion to a minimum of $4 billion per operation, explicitly to stem the sell-off and pull yields down from their highs. It worked, briefly: the 30-year eased toward 5.21 percent and the dollar softened. Weeks earlier, Bessent had helped engineer the first joint US–Japan currency intervention since 2011, buying yen — reportedly funded through euros — at a cost of some $5 to $10 billion, in part because a collapsing yen threatened to force Japan to sell its roughly $1.1 trillion in Treasuries to defend its currency.
These are not the moves of a man who finds market signals mysterious. They are the moves of a man managing a slow-motion funding train wreck in real time. And the market read them for exactly what they were. A Bloomberg gauge of the dollar fell to a three-month low after the buyback announcement; Citigroup and Deutsche Bank analysts concluded the Treasury’s real aim was to weaken the dollar to relieve yields. The verdict from strategists was blunt: Bessent is, in one analyst’s words, prepared to “sacrifice a bit of dollar strength” to keep yields in check — “something has to be the relief valve.” Another called the sequence of interventions a sign that policymakers are “panicking.” A former Treasury official of four decades called the yen intervention “ill-advised,” on the grounds that papering over currency pressure does nothing about the fiscal consolidation that actually drives it.
Here is the trap, and it is the same shape as the oil trap. Engineering yields lower by having the Treasury buy its own long bonds reduces the attractiveness of holding that debt in the first place. It is a departure from the “regular and predictable” issuance doctrine Bessent himself endorsed less than a year ago, and it reads to investors as a government quietly monetizing its own borrowing. The tool meant to stabilize the dollar is precisely the tool that erodes confidence in it. As Bloomberg put it, the dollar risks becoming the biggest loser from Bessent’s bond buying.
Step back and the two stories fuse into one. Bessent’s Treasury is running two campaigns at cross-purposes.
The first campaign weaponizes the dollar. The blockade, the “toughest sanctions in history,” the threat to declare Hormuz American territory, the promise to punish “any country that does business with Iran,” the secondary sanctions aimed squarely at Chinese banks and the yuan-denominated oil trade — all of it turns access to the dollar system into a coercive instrument. That is the point of it.
The second campaign needs the world to keep faith in that same dollar — to keep buying Treasuries, financing deficits, holding reserves in dollars, and thereby keeping American borrowing costs down. And these two campaigns cannot both succeed, because the first is a live demonstration, staged for every reserve manager on earth, of exactly what the dollar system can do to a country that falls out of Washington’s favor. Every escalation against Iran, and every threat against China for trading with it, is an advertisement for the alternatives — for settling oil in yuan through CIPS, for holding gold instead of Treasuries, for routing trade around the dollar entirely. You cannot make your currency the ultimate weapon and expect your adversaries to keep it as their savings account.
China is where the contradiction is sharpest, because China is simultaneously the villain of the first campaign and a load-bearing pillar of the second. It is the buyer Bessent wants to sanction for taking Iranian crude — and, by his own admission, the buyer whose steady purchases keep that crude cheap and Tehran starved of full-price revenue. It is also, still, one of the largest foreign holders of the debt the United States must roll over. The “unprecedented” measure the administration keeps teasing — cutting major Chinese banks out of the dollar system — would, if actually deployed, hand the single largest external creditor of the United States its clearest possible reason to accelerate out of dollars. The weapon and the funding source are the same country.
The through-line from the oil desk to the bond desk is a Treasury Secretary who narrates control while the two markets he most needs to reassure price the opposite, and who reaches for the word “noise” when they do. Oil is not spiking because traders are confused; it is spiking because the strait is shut and the war is widening. Foreign creditors are not stepping back because they misread the data; they are stepping back because a government that turns its currency into a weapon, and then buys its own bonds to hide the cost, is teaching them to hold less of it. Bessent can defend the yen, double the buybacks, and promise that the sanctions “will work.” But he cannot weaponize the dollar abroad and bank on it at home at the same time. The spike he says he doesn’t understand is simply the sound of the bill arriving.